In the aftermath of the financial crisis, governments in the western world resumed policy instruments from the immediate post-war period´s mixed economies. These instruments had all been abandoned in the liberalizing market economies of the last decades. How do we interpret these developments in the state's role in modern economies? Will we witness the return of the interventionist state or are these rather short-term measures rescuing globalized and liberal market economies? By focusing on the initial phase of crisis management between 2008 and 2010 we analyse the three most important policy tools used of the financial crisis: state ownership of banks, fiscal stimuli and the regulation of financial markets. We observe a new capacity of the nation-state to intervene, going beyond mere firefighting, but also falling short of the classic interventionist state. Under the conditions of global markets, state intervention is shaped by the logic of competition for protecting national industries and the logic of cooperation necessary to come to international agreements. For the future, we expect states will retain their newly found powers to protect national business in the global economy.
growth under the new supply-oriented and liberalized economic model. That is, until the financial crisis hit. Do government's answers to the financial crisis herald the coming of a new model in the state-market relationship? Does the pendulum once again swing in the other direction? Is the mixed economy of the Keynesian welfare state being rehabilitated? Several authors see the opportunity for the role of the state to become more active. In a financial crisis, the state potentially gains a new capacity to act, in that it nationalizes, regulates, and reasserts its power over the economy (Dullien et al. 2009) . A similar position is by Anatole Kaletsky, who describes a new configuration between the market and the state analogous to the Golden Age that followed World War II. After the laissez-faire of the 1920s, the New Deal of the early post-war period and the market fundamentalism of the 1980s and 1990s, we are about to see the advent of Capitalism 4.0:
Market fundamentalist assumptions are being replaced by a more pragmatic understanding of macroeconomics. Policymakers are rediscovering the use of monetary policy to manage employment as well as inflation, of public spending to create jobs, of tax incentives to encourage investment and currencies to promote export growth (Kaletsky 2010).
However, most of the voices discussing the consequences of the financial crisis for the state express far more skepticism. Many observers assume the state's new capacity to act is only due to the imperative need to save capitalism (Streeck 2010; Crouch 2009 ). Since the market itself cannot create the institutional foundations on which operates, it is necessary for the state to intervene time and again. It is argued that, in a crisis, governments attempt desperately to reestablish market conditions in order to restore free reign to the market and private market actors. The privatization of the economic order and polities is said to have already advanced so far that the state's primary function is to distribute the costs of finance capitalism among taxpayers and further privatize the profits. In other words, the state's new intervention directly serves private interests. This is -seemingly-reminiscent of the scope and abilities formerly ascribed to the Keynesian welfare state, though the effect is argued to be the opposite. Whereas the essence of the Keynesian welfare state was to act as the leveler among the various sectors of the population, in privatized Keynesianism (Crouch 2009 ), private consumption serves to re-stimulate the economy for the economic interests of proprietary classes.
In the following section we ask how the role of the state has changed in the wake of governmental reactions to the financial crisis in the initial phase between 2008 and 2010. Using the three principal avenues of intervention available to the state -nationalization, fiscal policy, and regulation -we examine the state's capability to act under the new conditions. We understand the capability to act as the capability to formulate, implement, and enforce political measures both within the state apparatus and, if necessary, against the interests of market actors. Although we are well aware the new government activities have been driven by the immediate necessity to act, we see signs indicating the adoption of a pragmatic approach toward interventionist policy tools that diminish the former ideologically colored reservations toward the state. In the course of the crisis, states have expanded their repertoire of instruments to manage the economy and, in this sense, gained 'strength'. A more pragmatic approach in the use of state instruments is shaped by two factors. First, by the imperative to safeguard investments and competitive conditions in the dominant economic sectors of national economies ('logic of competition') and second by the necessity to cooperate and coordinate actions with other governments when intervening on a major scale into the market ('logic of cooperation'). Both factors are a result of the particular kind of globalization that has emerged in the last three decades. We argue that the two factors, the logic of competition and the logic of cooperation, limit governmental action in the three areas being studied herenationalization, fiscal policy, and regulation. In all, our argument states that new hindrances resulting from the increasingly global political economy are working against governments' attempts to manage the economy that exceeds the immediate rescue from the crisis.
The Debate about the State before the Crisis
Common to all more recent analyses of the state is the observation of a farreaching change in the relationship between the market and the state in the last three decades. The fact itself is not contested, but rather its theoretical classification and evaluation (Grande 2008) . Prior to the financial crisis, the German debate dwelt on the transformation from a democratically institutionalized interventionist state (Zürn et al. 2004 ) with clear functions and authority, to one assuming a new function with regard to society and the market. At the international level, the new state was described as the 'Schumpeterian Workfare State' (Jessop 2007) , the 'Competition State' (Cerny 2000) , or the 'Regulatory State' (Majone 1997 ); yet no common terminology for this new type of statehood gained a permanent foothold. Just as rare, were indications that the transformation of the state was complete or the relationship between state and market had arrived at a new equilibrium. At the point when the financial crisis occurred, the state's functions of economic regulation and responsibility were in flux.
Considerably more consensus and continuity exists concerning what had constituted the 'old' interventionist state. This interventionist state of the post-war period had many avenues to intervene. It regulated markets and production processes, created human capital, infrastructure, and public services, corrected the distribution of income and social risks, and stabilized the fiscal course of the economy (Leibfried and Pierson 1995, 454ff.) . Its economic activity covered nearly 50 percent of the gross social product of developed countries.
Andrew Shonfield described postwar economies as 'mixed economies':
A mixed economy is one in which prices and supplies of goods and services are largely determined by market processes. At the same time, the state and its agencies have a large capacity for economic intervention, which is used in an endeavor to secure objectives that the market would, it is believed, not achieve automatically or not fast enough to meet the requirements of public policy (1984, 3) .
In his book Modern Capitalism -The changing balance of public and private power Shonfield maintains the state's role in 'mixed economies' exhibits the following five aspects (Shonfield 1965, 66-67) : First, public authorities' influence on the management of economic systems is vastly increased. This operates differently among countries, in one country the control of the banking system is decisive; in another it is part of a wide sector of publicly controlled enterprises. Second, rising public funds are made available to spend on public welfare or on Keynesian demand management. Third, governments engage in the 'taming' of the market through public regulation and encouragement of long-range collaboration between firms. Fourth, economic policy includes an active industrial policy to promote research and development, and the training of workers. And finally, governments are open to long-range national planning, both inside government and in the private sector.
The 'degree of mixedness' is not determined by the size of the public sector or the proportion of public expenditure to the national income. It is the function adopted by the state rather than its mass which counts. Governments and their agencies intervene either to accelerate a market process, or to delay it, or to bias the market in a certain direction by means of subsidies or taxes or by direct regulation. States attempt to reduce the losses of output and welfare which are caused by fluctuations in private business sentiment and activity (Shonfield 1984, 4) .
Mixed economies became the leading economic-political model after World War II partly because of the experiences of the Great Depression and the macroeconomic theory of Keynesianism. They were facilitated politically by the electoral success of socialist and social democratic governments, which implemented instruments of planned economy and nationalized key industries (e.g., French steel industry, Swedish shipbuilding). They viewed planning and nationalization as means to protect and support key national industries in economically unstable times ('national champions' strategy). The growing concentration of business and the oligopolistic structures in sectors such as the chemical, electronic and steel industries favored 'mixed forums of coordination' on middle-range planning and the corporatist exchange with strong unions.
The OECD countries view of themselves as mixed economies ended with the advent of the oil crisis. Inflationary pressures could no longer be held in check by negotiated wage restraints. In the realm of economic theory, the insight became widely held that demand-side policies intensified the rise in prices, but had no effect on the production of goods or the national income. The state was classified as subsidiary and government action was said to be necessary only should markets fail completely. In short, all elements of mixed economies were discredited and successively discontinued.
In place of state ownership and to protect key national industries, there ensued the privatization and deregulation of sectors close to the state, aiming to produce profits through greater efficiency. The state pulled back from its role as provider. In many cases, this meant a renewed regulation of the sectors in which private companies were given specific access to formerly public utility companies.
Where the welfare state had once guaranteed social security, now private providers entered the area of social politics by introducing capital-covered pensions and health insurance. New welfare state philosophies proposed a greater individualization of risks, the privatization of certain aspects or even entire branches of social security, and the change from passive instruments of labor market policy to activating measures.
In fiscal policy, the predominant conviction became that a higher national income could be achieved primarily through structural reforms and improved conditions of supply. Instead of taming the market through regulation of competition and access, barriers in trade policy were dismantled and controls for the cross-border movement of capital were discontinued. It was thought that such simplification of cross-border investment would generate greater economic dynamics, which in turn would lead to a greater division of labor worldwide and to the opportunity for the specialization of national economies.
However, the forced retreat of the state was not uniform everywhere. For example, the share of public expenditures in the gross national product of most countries hardly dropped. In the twenty-five years prior to the financial crisis, the percentage of state expenditures in the gross national product in the OECD actually rose on average. Despite the emphasis on supply-side economics, both private and public demand have tended to be sustained by public expenditures, tax breaks, increasing debt, and low interest rates. Even the privatization of public utility companies often did not mean a deregulation and decentralization of the market.
The transformation from a mixed economy to a selectively liberal market economy had far-reaching consequences for the function of the state. Even though the state continued to intervene during the phase of privatizing the mixed economy and used taxes, subsidies, and regulations to influence large areas of market activity, it no longer did this out of managerial interests. The state had lost any legitimacy as wanting to or being able to successfully manage the economy (Beckert 2009 ).
Externally, the nation-state lost sovereignty to the European Union, international economic institutions, and other regimes that hindered national measures to restrict markets. The European project was aimed at creating markets, an aim that was forced forward by the special competences of the EU in competition policy or by the prominent role of the European Court of Justice. The GATT regulations impeded national trade limitations and subsidies. Regulative measures to 'tame' market actors had to be passed at the transnational and supranational levels (e.g. the regulation of privatized sectors involving infrastructure, telecommunications and electricity; the regulation of the financial sector).
Internally, the state lost its capacity to impact market actors. Multi-and transnational enterprises used their exit options in order to avoid government policies that would increase their production costs. Under the conditions of open markets, Keynesian measures to stimulate demand did not seem practical, because they benefited foreign, instead of domestic, producers. In this respect, the maneuvering room for nation-states had already shrunk noticeably even before the financial crisis.
What has happened to the state in the financial crisis? At first glance it is evident the state has again assumed many roles and functions that Shonfield However, theoretically at least, the conflict between domestic preferences and international cooperation is not automatically decided in favour of domestic producers. Rather, domestic preferences shape the interaction and thereby close some policy-avenues. As participation in supranational policy-making increasingly becomes an end in itself for protecting domestic interests, governments can be expected to compromise in exchange with participation in decision-making.
The subsequent sections will provide an analysis on the state responses in financial crisis with a particular focus on the state's strategy with regard to the ownership of banks, fiscal policy and the regulatory policy of financial market with a focus on the period up to 2010. Based on three case studies, Germany, United Kingdom and the United states, the national strategies and implemented policy tools will be compared and evaluated. This will serve as an illustration of the two logics at play. Even though the national rescue packages were neither conceived, nor primarily implemented with competition over investments in mind, the consequences of state help on competition in the financial sectors of other countries were indeed discussed. The EU Commission was also critical of any possibility that the bailouts could subsidize competition. Following considerable criticism by the member states, especially Sweden and France, of the slow pace with which billions of aid were being allocated, the Commission began to harmonize, step by step, the aid schemes for government capital injections into the banking sector. They then demanded higher interest payments from needy banks than from basically healthy banks, for whom the financial injections were only used to spur bank lending (Handelsblatt 9 December 2008) .
The aim of the rescue packages was to re-establish trust among the banks in order to revive inter-bank trade and ensure the flow of credit to businesses. States, Great Britain and France, governments exerted sometimes soft and other times massive pressure to ensure that public funds were accepted by the largest bank in each country, because it was considered the most relevant to the health of the financial sector. To guard against credit risks, banks in Great Britain were required by the government to prove they had raised their core capital ratio to 9 percent; otherwise they were forced to accept government help (IMF 2011, 54) . The United States and Great Britain actively expanded state ownership of suffering banks by purchasing non-voting preferred shares, with the view that future profits from dividend payments would eventually flow back into the state treasury and thereby to taxpayers (Tigges 2008 ). The Financial Market Stabilization Fund set up in Germany in October 2008, with a value of 400 billion euro, offered state aid on a voluntary basis. In principle, the money was available to every bank, not just those relevant to the entire financial system, with the aim to avoid any possible 'distortion to competition'. State investment followed in the form of non-participating shareholding, instead of share acquisition, in which the state retained a say regarding dividend payments, managerial salaries, and the business policies of the banks in question. In the public discussion, concerns about the legality of the growing state ownership in the banking sector were expressed at a point when the major financial institutions were already partly nationalized in the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. German banks were hesitant to take advantage of government help, and largely requested state guarantees instead of injections of capital from the rescue funds. Following the rescue of Länder banks, the Commerzbank was the first private big bank to apply for state funds in the form of non-participating shareholding (until January 2009 to a sum of 18.2 bn. euro), while Deutsche Bank's CEO Ackermann said "I would be ashamed if we were to take state money during this crisis" (Dempsey 2008) . Germany found the issue of nationalization a more difficult one than did other countries and it was not until bankruptcy We pledge today to sustain our strong policy response until a durable recovery is secured. We will act to ensure that when growth returns, jobs do too. We will avoid any premature withdrawal of stimulus. At the same time, we will prepare our exit strategies and, when the time is right, withdraw our extraordinary policy support in a cooperative and coordinated way, maintaining our commitment to fiscal responsibility (Wolf 2010) . or European law. Simultaneously -and this highlights a key dilemma in this area -the international negotiations on security standards always expressed policy preferences regarding the protection of national firms. Every government sought to avoid strengthening regulatory constraints that would put its own national finance sector at a disadvantage in international competition. As a result, the standards agreed upon reflect a consensus based on the 'smallest common denominator' and often represent the success of national or international bank lobbying (e.g., the G30 or the Institute of International Finance (IIF). Therefore it is not surprising to find that in the last ten to fifteen years regulatory tasks have increasingly been delegated to private market actors -visible in the regulation of derivatives, hedge funds, rating agencies, accounting standards and especially the setting of capital adequacy standards for banks (Basel II). Regulatory jurisdiction has been turned over to private bodies (e.g. accounting) and regulation has occurred through nonbinding 'codes of best practices' (hedge funds, derivatives, rating agencies). Also the content of regulation (such as the calculation of and safeguarding against credit risk) were defined by the banks and the supervision left essentially to market mechanisms (Basel II). All in all, it is the concurrency of cooperation logic and location logic that definitively limits the ability of each individual nation-state to take action in this area. As will be shown, this has not changed in the current financial crisis. Two trends characterize current regulation activity: first, the content of regulation is being expanded and combined with public jurisdiction in areas that were previously regulated privately or not at all; second, the institutional architecture of financial oversight is being strengthened, which is the manifestation of a new regulation philosophy and is associated with the reorganization of the regulatory structure.
Since the fall of 2008, the progress in regulating financial markets has been essentially determined by the decisions reached at G20 summits, which have replaced the G7 summits as the platform for international cooperation (Alexandroff and Kirton 2010) . The network of states and domain experts, which had previously focused on the circle of Western industrial countries, has been broadened during the course of dealing with the crisis to include the 'emerging markets' (especially China, India, and Brazil, BRIC). This development reflects the changed power relations within the global economy.
Basic guidelines for regulating financial markets are now decided at G20
summits; the translation of these guidelines into specific technical formulations is then delegated to expert panels (such as the Basel Committee that the equity ratio of the standard was too low overall (Porter 2010, 64-65) .
In September 2010, the Basel Committee agreed on the new Basel III standard, which was ratified by the member countries of the G20 in Seoul in November 2010. According to this standard, the minimum requirement for common equity will be raised considerably and will be further expanded by the introduction of new capital buffers. The common equity should only be made up of shares and retained earnings, while the non-participating shareholding so important in Germany, or public funds, will become less important for securing against risk (BIS 2010). It is not surprising that Germany views these rules as disadvantageous for its own banking system and opposed them to the very end. It was decided to grant a long transition phase (until 2019) to
give banks the chance to cover their capital needs (Handelsblatt 7 September 2010; Frühauf 2010; Enrich and Paletta 2010) . In contrast, no consensus exists at the G20 level on the issues of introducing a financial market transaction tax and a bank levy, neither of which could be implemented due to the resistance of Canada and the BRIC countries, among others (Beattie 2010) . Even though the international community is still far from attaining the goal of creating a security net without loopholes, there are indications that regulatory progress is being made in many key issues, due primarily to the change in preferences expressed by the United States and Great Britain.
As At the European level it is becoming evident that a supranationalization of regulatory responsibilities over the financial markets is taking hold, as was long and repeatedly rejected especially by Germany and Great Britain. In September 2010, EU member states agreed to set up three European regulatory agencies, one for banks (EBA), one for securities and stock exchanges (ESMA) and one for insurances (EIOPA). These build on the three existing European expert committees and commenced their work in January 2011. The new agencies are not to replace national oversight, but they do have the right to intervene in conflicts between national bodies, directly enact standards for credit institutions and markets and ban risky financial products.
In cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), that represents the ECB and the presidents of the twenty-seven national central banks, the new regulatory agencies are to set up an 'early warning system' for systemic dangers (Kafsack 2010b) . Though the process of institution building is certainly incomplete, the number of new regulatory responsibilities indicates, of all institutions involved, the central banks are clearly the winners of the crisis. At least on the national level, their importance has increased at the cost of the disempowerment of pre-existing banking regulatory bodies. They had to relinquish some responsibilities to the European level and some to the new consumer protection authorities, making these regulatory bodies the apparent losers of the crisis. The one certain winner is expert bureaucracy as a whole.
The State in Global Capitalism
The rescue of capitalism in the financial crisis has placed the state once again at the hub of economic policy management. In the Western industrial countries, the state demonstrated power and the ability to act. Governments passed legislation, sometimes using fast-track procedures that had extraordinary consequences for their national budgets, intervened in the property rights of banks and other firms and completely reorganized financial regulations. The acceleration of decision making processes was usually accompanied by a strengthening of the executive branch of government. In all Western industrial countries, new institutions (regulatory authorities, bankrescue and restructuring funds) were established and the bureaucracy involved in regulating financial markets was expanded during the course of the crisis. It remains to be seen whether the strengthening of the state apparatus will continue to reinforce the top-heaviness of the decision making process favoring executive branch of government, as was evident in the crisis management, or whether, over time, this will once again give way to established modes of politics and policy.
An important finding of our analysis is that Germany, found it exceptionally difficult to recognize the necessity of economic policy action in the crisis. The 1 Data from the OECD shows the share of government expenditure in most countries has stagnated, but not that it has been reduced to any great degree (Schäfer 2009 ). 2 High debt levels prevent the effective implementation of fiscal policy instruments, or more specifically, they increase future costs. The uncertainties over the creditworthiness of governments then replace the uncertainty over the liquidity of banks on the part of market players. There is a danger that the long-term interest for government bonds will rise if private investors judge the risk of insolvency to be greater. In particular, the assumption of economists pertaining to the expected growth rates of the developing countries and the trust of investors in the budget policy of the OECD countries determine the various positions. Financial Times, IMF Warns on Global Recovery, 8 July 2010. See also Reinhardt and Rogoff (2010) and Blanchard et al. (2010) . 3 On the discussion about the impact of over-indebtedness on limiting the state's ability to act for the United States, see Hacker and Pierson (2006) , and for Germany, Streeck (2010) and Streeck and Mertens (2010) .
